Mochi's War Page 4

  The Indian leaders admitted their animosity toward the white man and why they felt as they did. Black Kettle assured all present that the tribes wanted to live in harmony if possible. Colonel Chivington told the chiefs that peace could only happen when and if all the hostile members of the Plains Nations, specifically the Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians, surrendered. There were still many Indian warriors who refused to stop raids on army posts and settlers. “My rule of fighting white men or Indians is to fight them until they lay down their arms and submit to military authority,” Colonel Chivington announced. Compliance with Colonel Chivington’s terms was not immediate. Black Kettle and a large contingent of Cheyenne Indians were among those who would eventually follow the colonel’s directives.[36]

  More than six hundred Indians, including Black Kettle, set up camp thirty-five miles from Fort Lyon on Sand Creek.[37] In mid-November a winter storm broke over the region, covering the encampment with snow. Mochi, her family, and the other Indians believed Winter Man would stay in the Cheyenne country for several months.[38] According to Cheyenne legend, Winter Man liked to sweep over the people gathered around campfire, feasting and singing. It made him angry to see the Indian happy. It also made him angry to see anyone besides the Indian on the prairie. Winter Man wanted the Cheyenne to remember the power he ultimately had to send snow and drive animals into hiding from his fury.[39] Mochi’s father and grandfather told her that Winter Man had brought the violent snowstorm in the winter of 1864 to protest the Cheyenne alliance with the white man.[40] Black Kettle and his band of Cheyenne were willing to risk antagonizing Winter Man in exchange for peace between the Indians and the flood of newcomers claiming their native homeland.

  1. Logansport Daily Star, March 2, 1874; Danville Republican, December 22, 1910.

  2. Brad D. Lookingbill, War Dance at Fort Marion: Plains Indian War Prisoners, 56–60.

  3. Ibid.; Danville Republican, December 22, 1910.

  4. Grace Jackson Penney, Tales of the Cheyennes, 15–19.

  5. Ibid., 26–35; Patrick M. Mendoza, Ann Strange-Owl-Raben, and Nico Strange-Owl, Four Great Rivers to Cross: Cheyenne History, Culture and Traditions, 11–18.

  6. Mendoza et al., Four Great Rivers to Cross, 57–62.

  7. George Bird Grinnell, “Some Early Cheyenne Tales,” Journal of American Folklore 20, 171–73.

  8. Ibid.

  9. Peter Harrison, Mochi: Cheyenne Indian Warrior, 4–7.

  10. Reginald S. Craig, The Fighting Parson: Biography of Colonel John M. Chivington, 159–60.

  11. Daily Rocky Mountain News, August 10, 1864.

  12. Ibid.

  13. Craig, Fighting Parson, 159–60.

  14. Ibid., 22–25.

  15. John Speer, “Report to Fred Martin of Interview with Mrs. John Chivington”; Lori Cox-Paul, “John M. Chivington: The Reverend Colonel,” 128–30.

  16. Patricia Kinney Kaufman, My Mother’s People to Colorado They Came, 21–24; History of the Reverends John M. and Isaac Chivington in their Relationship to the Early Methodist Episcopal Church in Kansas and Nebraska.

  17. Craig, Fighting Parson, 29–33.

  18. Ibid., 34–36.

  19. Ibid.

  20. Ibid., 34–35; John R. Swanton, Indian Tribes of North America Bulletin, 235.

  21. Kaufman, My Mother’s People, 23; Craig, Fighting Parson, 35.

  22. Craig, Fighting Parson, 40–41.

  23. Ibid.

  24. Ibid., 42–44; Kaufman, My Mother’s People, 22–23.

  25. Kaufman, My Mother’s People, 23–24; Craig, Fighting Parson, 43.

  26. Craig, Fighting Parson, 65; Isaac H. Beardsley, Echoes from Peak and Plain: Tales of Life, War, Travel, and Colorado Methodism, 242.

  27. Craig, Fighting Parson, 142.

  28. Ibid., 110–14; Las Vegas Daily Optic, July 15, 1958.

  29. Kaufman, My Mother’s People, 25–28.

  30. Ibid.; Craig, Fighting Parson, 144–46.

  31. Craig, Fighting Parson, 154–57.

  32. Ibid.; Robert H. Lowie, Indians of the Plains, 106–10.

  33. Craig, Fighting Parson, 163–64.

  34. George E. Hyde, Life of George Bent: Written from His Letters, 131–34; Report of the Secretary of War Sand Creek Massacre, Senate Executive Doc. No. 26, 169.

  35. Report of the Secretary of War Sand Creek Massacre, Senate Executive Doc. No. 26, 87–91; Craig, Fighting Parson, 171–73.

  36. Robert Vine and John Mack Faragher, The American West: A New Interpretive History, 228.

  37. Craig, Fighting Parsons, 175–76; Kaufman, My Mother’s People, 32–33.

  38. Penney, Tales of the Cheyennes, 45–52.

  39. Ibid.

  40. Ibid.; Mendoza et al., Four Great Rivers to Cross, 57–59.

  Chapter 3

  Terms of Surrender

  Silence hung taut and crystal clear over Denver, where Colonel Chivington and the First and Third Colorado Cavalry were stationed one morning in early November 1864. The regiments were bored, cold, and frustrated. They had joined the call to arms to put an end to the actions of hostile Indians against those who sought to expand the western territory.[1] The Plains Indians, which included the Arapaho, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Pawnee, Sioux, and Ute, were standing in the way of the economic growth of the United States, and the army had been instructed to remedy the situation. Members of the First and Third Colorado Cavalry were anxious to get the job done and go home, but the frigid weather had brought their plans to a halt.[2]

  Although Black Kettle and his band of Cheyenne had agreed to discuss peace, Colonel Chivington and other officers such as Major Scott Anthony felt the Indians had not fully complied with the conditions set by the military for talk of peace to even begin.[3] A number of warring Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes had not agreed to surrender all their weapons or their horses to the government.[4] The Indian horse was an incredibly hardy animal which could endure the winter months better than cavalry horses.[5] Men such as Chivington knew if the Indians were to be conquered it was essential that their horses be confiscated in order to keep them from riding to future raids and attacks.[6] Chivington and Major Anthony questioned the sincerity of Black Kettle and the other Indian leaders regarding total surrender and suspected their motivation was winter temperatures and lack of food.[7]

  The army initially provided supplies to the Indian tribes living at Sand Creek that were willing to consider peace, but after a while those supplies dwindled and Major Anthony turned the Indians away. He returned the limited weapons that had been confiscated, too, and told the Indians they needed to return to the prairie to hunt.[8] The military’s behavior made the Cheyenne and Arapaho more wary of the United States government’s word. They now believed soldiers would follow after them and attack.[9]

  Colonel Chivington was preoccupied with the morale of his troops and the fact that their enlistments were almost completed.[10] Whatever action was going to be taken against the Indians had to be done soon, or there would be no soldiers left to aid in a fight. While considering the options before him, Chivington reviewed a directive he had issued on November 9, 1863, which read, “All persons whomsoever within the District of Colorado are strictly forbidden to sell or give away to any Indians living within or who may visit the bounds of the District, any powder, lead or gun caps until further notice. Any person violating this order will be deemed guilty of military offense and will be dealt with accordingly.”[11] As far as Colonel Chivington knew, the order had not been violated, but the troops were tired of the enforcement of the directive being their side job. Soldiers whose enlistment had almost run out reminded their commanding officer to “use them or lose them.” Chivington felt pressed to do just that.[12]

  The more time passed the more anxious Chivington became. He imagined a full-scale invasion of settlements and forts in the region by Dog Soldiers. He wrote letters to his superiors and his wife expressing his concern that if the Indians he referred to as “red rebels” were not held accountable for their uncivilized behavio
r they would never stop.[13]

  Chivington was not alone in thinking that the Plains Indians were murderers who should be killed, imprisoned, or defeated through force. Both Major S. G. Colley of the Upper Arkansas Indian Agency and Colonel George Shoup agreed the Indians were problematic and needed to answer for their hostile acts. The officers all believed that “no lasting peace could be made until all the Indians were severely punished.”[14]

  One of the most egregious acts the Indians perpetrated was on the women captured by war parties.[15] According to the book Massacre of the Mountains by J. P. Dunn, women were treated particularly badly by Plains Indians. A woman captive was considered common property of all the warriors and was raped nightly until the Indians reached their village. At that point the woman became sole property of the one who captured her. She was often sold or gambled away to another tribe. If the woman resisted, her arms and legs were tied to four pegs driven into the ground to prevent her from struggling. She was beaten, mutilated, or even killed for resisting. If a woman continued to try to escape after such treatment, she was maimed so as to ensure death in case of rescue and left to die slowly.[16]

  White men who captured Indian women often raped their victims as well, but Indian women rarely gave their testimonies to anyone who could make the attackers answer for their offenses.[17]

  General Patrick Conner, commander of the military district of Utah, left Colonel Chivington with the impression that the Secretary of War had sent him to find out if the campaign against the Indians was being conducted as it should be. After his meeting with Chivington, General Conner made a comment that fueled Chivington’s notion that the government wanted the situation with the Indians handled once and for all. “I think from the temper of the men that you have, and all I can learn, that you will give these Indians a most terrible thrashing if you can catch them,” General Conner told Chivington. “If it was in the mountains and you had them in a canyon with escape cut off, you could catch them; but I’m afraid on these plains you won’t do it.”[18] Chivington assured the general that he and his troops were prepared to do what was needed and told him that he would contact the general with the result of their encounter with the warring tribes.[19]

  On November 23, 1864, Colonel Chivington rallied his troops together and traveled to Fort Lyon, where he assumed command of an expedition to seek out and attack hostile Plains Indians. Chivington had no official orders to embark on the mission, and he was reminded of that by a few officers under him.[20] Captain Charles Soule reminded the colonel that peaceful Indians were expecting the government to honor the agreement to protect them and see that they were not attacked. Convinced there were no peaceful Indians, Chivington dismissed the warning and proceeded with his plan to annihilate them.[21]

  Fearful that word of the intention of the expedition would be leaked to the Indians, Colonel Chivington intercepted all travelers along the route to and from Fort Lyon. He took pioneers and traders into temporary custody and left detachments of guards at all ranches and settlements. He also ordered a picket around the fort to prevent anyone leaving without authorization.[22]

  Major Anthony supported Chivington’s safeguard measures and expressed his gratitude to the officers for being there. “Damn glad you’ve come, Colonel!” Anthony later recalled saying. “I’ve got a band of hostiles only forty miles from here and have been waiting for assistance in dealing with them.”[23] Chivington and his staff, Major Anthony and Major S. G. Colley of the Upper Arkansas Indian Agency, met at the post headquarters to discuss a plan of action. In the meeting Major Anthony was asked to elaborate on the whereabouts of the Indians. Anthony explained that there was a band of more than one thousand Indians encamped on Sand Creek forty miles to the north. “Mostly Cheyenne under Chief Black Kettle,” Anthony added, “with a few Arapaho, and another group of about two thousand more Cheyenne on the Smoky Hill, sixty to seventy miles further north.” Major Anthony went on to tell the officers that the Cheyenne had rejected an offer of peace and that there was every indication the Indians would attack the post. Major Colley confirmed Major Anthony’s assessment of the situation and explained to Colonel Chivington, “I have done everything in my power to make them behave themselves, but for the past six months I have been able to do nothing with them. In my opinion, they should be punished for their hostile acts.”[24]

  After hearing what others had to say about the matter, Colonel Chivington made the decision to confront the Indians. According to federal court documents, Colonel Chivington informed Major Anthony that he was going to march to Sand Creek.[25] Anthony offered to be a part of the march and volunteered the 125 men in his command to accompany them. He advised Colonel Chivington to surround the Sand Creek camp so that no one could escape and alert the main band of Cheyenne on the Smoky Hill about what was happening. Anthony felt this strategy would give Indians and agents in the camp the opportunity to escape before any fighting began. Among those Anthony believed were friendly and interested in peace were Black Kettle and Left Hand. Chivington was not convinced they were sincere about living harmoniously under the government’s rule.[26] The colonel recalled:

  Black Kettle is the principle chief of the Cheyenne nation which has been engaged in bloody war with whites since April [1864]. His claim of friendship seems to have arisen with the ending of the summer season and the approach of cold weather when Indians fight at a disadvantage. However, it is not my intention to attack without warning. Actual operations must, of course, depend upon conditions which we find on arrival, but I propose to first immobilize the Indians, if possible, and then to offer them a parley on terms of surrender. Such terms would include the delivering up for punishment of all savages guilty of hostilities, the return of all stolen properties, the surrender of all firearms and the giving of hostages to ensure against further hostilities.[27]

  Chivington and Anthony combined their efforts to choreograph a precise plan of attack. It was decided that a number of howitzers would be used in the expedition. The powerful artillery pieces were used to propel shells at high angles and were much more forceful than a rifle. The post quartermaster provided the ammunition and rations needed for the impending battle. The troops were assembled and informed that they would be leaving at once for Sand Creek.[28]

  Captain Soule again raised an objection to the attack. His sentiments were echoed by Major Wynkoop, an officer at Fort Lyon who had successfully negotiated a surrender of the hostages the Cheyenne had taken in early 1864. The two men felt that Black Kettle and the band of Indians he oversaw deserved to be thanked for their cooperation and exempted from any raid.[29]

  Lieutenant Joseph Cramer, one of Chivington’s men, attempted to reason with Chivington and persuade him to abandon the idea of invading the Indian camps along Sand Creek. Chivington refused to listen and threatened Lieutenant Cramer with a court martial if he went against his commanding officer. “The Cheyenne Nation has been waging bloody war against the whites,” Chivington reminded Lieutenant Cramer. “They have been guilty of robbery, arson, murder, rape, and fiendish torture, not even sparing women and little children. I believe it right and honorable to use any means under God’s heaven to kill Indians who kill and torture children and women. Damn any man who is in sympathy with them.”[30]

  “I will obey your orders,” Lieutenant Cramer told Chivington, “but only under protest. I feel it would be murder to attack those Indians.”[31]

  The final march to Sand Creek began at eight o’clock at night on November 28, 1864. Colonel Chivington led 750 soldiers across the trackless prairie. Motivated by vengeance and the desire to prove himself to government officials who had criticized him for his inability to restrain the Indians, Chivington was resolved to give the Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders and their bands a lesson they would remember.[32]

  Major Anthony’s Indian scout acted as guide for the troops. It was a cold, cloudless night, and the men took turns walking and trotting their horses on the route the Indian was leading them. When they were eight t
o ten miles from the Indian camp the march was brought to a halt. Chivington was annoyed. He had given orders that the expedition would keep moving until its objective was accomplished. The guide defended his decision to stop, telling Chivington that there was a risk of the Indians hearing them if they continued. “Wolf he howl, Injun dog he hear wolf and dog howl too; Injun he hear dog and listen, hear something and run off,” the guide explained.[33]